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The motivations underlying the pursuit of college prestige in Japan presumes a labor 
market that rewards workers according to the quality of the college that they attended.  
Yet, studies that examine the relationship between college quality and earnings in Japan 
remain few and riddled with shortcomings.  This paper examines the returns to college 
education among Japanese men.  Using a 1995 cross-sectional data of Japanese workers, 
I find that college quality significantly improves earnings.  My findings confirm that 
college quality plays a crucial role in shaping both incentives and earnings in the 
Japanese labor market.  The paper also examines the so-called distinctive features of the 
Japanese labor market, and confirms the significant impact of tenure and firm-size on 
earnings, and the similarity in the earnings profiles between blue- and white-collar 
workers. 
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1  Introduction 
  The pursuit of college prestige in Japan is unparalleled.  Acceptance into the 
top universities is extremely competitive.  Students, with generous support from their 
parents, make considerable investments in their mission to gain entry into the 
prestigious universities.  The motivations underlying such investments can only be 
explained under a labor market that rewards workers in accordance to the quality of the 
college that they attended.   
  The aim of this paper is to examine the effects of college quality on earnings in 
the Japanese labor market.  In contrast to the volume of research that documents the 
competitive process of college entrance in Japan, research that examines the returns to 
college quality remains few and riddled with shortcomings.  My research attempts to fill 
this void.  Using a unique 1995 cross-sectional dataset, we estimate college quality 
effects using a properly specified earnings equation that controls for both supply- and 
demand-side characteristics of the labor market. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the relevant literature 
on college quality and features of the Japanese labor market that may affect the 
specification of the earnings function.  Section 3 describes the data and variables used 
in the estimations.  Section 4, presents the analysis of the returns from college education 
and the impact of labor market characteristics using Mincerian regressions.  Section 5 
summarizes the paper’s main findings and discusses directions for further research.
  
2  Background 
The effect of college quality on earnings   2
  In his seminal work, Schooling, Experience and Earnings, Mincer (1974) 
explains that the explanatory power of the human capital earnings function can be 
further increased when the quality of schooling can be controlled for.  Schooling is an 
investment that imparts skills, and these skills increase productivity and earnings.  But 
if productivity gains vary depending on the quality of the institution attended, then it is 
likely that earnings estimates will be biased if we do not control for quality differences. 
  In comparison to the volume of research that examines the returns to the 
quantity of schooling, studies focusing on quality effects are relatively few, mainly 
because of the difficulty in obtaining detailed information about student and 
institutional characteristics (James et al 1989).  Nevertheless, researchers have 
advanced the schooling quality literature by outlining the definitions and measurement 
of school quality (Solmon 1975; Welch 1966), incorporating schooling quality into the 
Mincerian estimation (Behrman and Birdsall 1983; Solmon and Wachtel 1975), and 
examining the relationship between individual ability, school quality and earnings 
(Brewer, Eide and Ehrenberg 1999; Dale and Krueger 1999; Griliches and Mason 1972; 
Kingston and Smart 1990; Solmon and Wachtel 1975).  
  Studies looking at school quality effects have concentrated on differences in 
college quality, given that data on quality differences (such as mean SAT scores and per 
pupil expenditure) are more readily observable at the college level than at the high 
school level.  These theoretical and methodological advances have given rise to a 
number of empirical studies in the U.S., all of which confirm that college quality   3
improves individual earnings or upward mobility.
1  The U.S. evidence thus supports the 
claim that it matters where one goes to college, and not just how much college 
education one receives.  The prestige of the college degree has significant economic 
consequences, and “where one was schooled” is a salient feature of everyday life 
(Kingston and Lewis 1990). 
 
The Case of Japan 
  In Japan, the question of who graduated from where is a national obsession.   
Articles that feature personnel moves among important persons – whether they be in 
politics, government or the private sector – will be sure to report the which schools they 
graduated from.  In addition, there are numerous publications that rank the number of 
politicians, bureaucrats and executives by their graduating institutions on an annual 
basis.
2  As Dore (1973) explains, “it is not so much important to get into a university as 
important to get to the right university.” (p.294, emphasis mine). 
  In Japan, admission into college requires successfully passing the entrance 
examinations administered by each institution.  Examination hell, which refers to the 
cramming and preparing that the students undertake in order to pass the entrance 
examinations, is an expression common to all households with college bound children.  
Unlike in Western societies where factors such as high school performance and 
extracurricular activities are considered in the admission process, college admission in 
                                                 
1 See Fox (1993), James, et al (1989), Kingston and Smart (1990), Loury and Garman (1995), Morgan 
and Duncan (1979), Solmon (1975) and Wales (1973) for studies on college quality and earnings, and 
Ishida, Spilerman and Su (1997), Karabel and McClelland (1987), and Useem and Karabel (1985) for 
studies relating to college quality and promotions. 
2 See for example publications by Diamond, Kawai Juku, and Toyo Keizai.   4
Japan is determined almost entirely by the performance in entrance examinations.
3 
  Investments undertaken in examination hell are considerable.  Some 30 percent 
of students spend additional years preparing for these examinations after high school 
graduation, often attending specialized college preparatory schools.  According to 
Sakurai (1997), the supplementary education industry in Japan now grosses one percent 
of the country’s GDP, and secular trends show that the proportion of household 
expenditures spent on supplementary education has grown monotonically in the postwar 
period.  Bowman (1981) explains: 
 
This sort of supplementary university preparation is familiar in countries in which 
only a small minority of highly advantaged individuals complete upper-secondary 
school; Greece and Brazil are examples.  But Japan is different, with the large and 
growing rates of enrollment in higher education.  In Japan competition for entry to 
preferred institutions has reached a frenzy probably matched in no other part of the 
world (1981: 15). 
 
  The motivations underlying examination hell can only be explained under a 
labor market that rewards workers depending on the quality of the college that they 
attended:  If all workers were rewarded the same regardless of college quality, then 
there would be no incentive to invest in college quality.  Hence there is good reason to 
suspect significant variation in rewards as a function of college quality. 
                                                 
3 In recent years, Japanese universities have increased the proportion of students admitted through 
recommendations (suisen nyugaku) and have started to introduce admissions procedures similar to the 
U.S. where applicants are evaluated on the basis of their high-school performance and activities.  
However, these proportions are still small.  For example, according to the 1997 Obunsha publication, the 
proportion of applicants accepted through recommendation at Waseda University and Keio University 
were 8 percent and 3 percent, respectively.  For the1945 to 1991 cohort of applicants covered in the 
current study, these proportions are even smaller.  Hence, we assume in this study that the majority of the 
students entered universities through the entrance examinations.  For current data concerning the number 
of students admitted through recommendation, see for example: 
http://www3.asahi.com/opendoors/gaku/daigaku/index.html (in Japanese).   5
  The competitive nature of the college entrance process in Japan has attracted 
considerable attention from scholars from various disciplines.  However, most studies 
focus on the process itself (Rohlen 1983; Stevenson and Baker 1992; Tsukada 1991).  
Studies that examine college quality effects on occupational outcomes are extremely 
few, and their findings are limited.  For example, Ando (1994) uses the 1975 Social 
Stratification and Mobility survey and categorizes universities into “five arbitrary 
groups of prestige” (1994: 288) – top national universities, other national and public 
universities, top private universities, other selective private universities, and other 
private universities – and cross tabulates these groups with current earnings in four 
different cohorts.
4  Based on this categorization, Ando finds very little systematic 
difference between groups.  Using the same data, Ishida groups universities into three 
categories of prestige – highly selective, selective, and non-selective – and finds that 
graduates of highly selective and selective institutions have higher income than those of 
non-selective institutions.
5 
  The main reason why research in this field has been limited is that micro-level 
data including individual information on college quality (or college affiliation) have not 
been publicly available.  Consequently, some researchers have gone to great lengths to 
                                                 
4 “Top national universities” include the seven former Imperial Universities - Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokyo, 
Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, Kyushu - plus Tokyo Institute of Technology, Hitotsubashi, Kobe, Tokyo 
University of Foreign Studies and Osaka University of Foreign Studies.  “Other national and public 
universities” include national and public universities not included in the “top national universities.”  “Top 
private universities” include Waseda and Keio.  “Other selective private universities” include Meiji, 
Hosei, Rikkyo, Chuo, Doshisha, Ritsumeikan, Kansai Gakuin, Jouchi (Sophia), Aoyama, Meiji Gakuin, 
ICU and Gakushuin.  “Other private universities” include private universities not included in the “top” 
and “other selective private universities.”  
5 “Highly selective universities” include the seven former Imperial Universities plus Tokyo Institute of 
Technology, Hitotsubashi, Kobe, Waseda and Keio.  “Selective universities” include all other national 
and public universities, plus the “other selective private universities” from Ando’s study (see previous 
footnote).  “Other private universities” include all other private universities.   6
overcome this obstacle by estimating the rates of return through a series of simulations 
using aggregate data.  These studies typically rely on two different sources of data.  The 
first source of data is occupational outcomes by college.  Commonly used data of this 
form is Daigaku betsu Shushoku Shirabe (occupational outcomes by college) published 
by Recruit which reports, for example, the distribution of the graduates of college x, that 
entered industry sector y, of firm size z.  The second source is the Basic Wage Survey 
which reports the basic wages of workers by industry sector and firm size.  Rates of 
return are then estimated using the conditional probability of a given college group 
entering a certain sector of the labor market.  Because of the number of procedures 
involved, researchers typically pre-select a small sub-sample of colleges or college 
categories of interest.  The results of two representative studies (Iwamura 1996; Yano 
1978) conducted under this estimation procedure are reported in Table 1.
6  Although 
these estimates are a significant improvement in comparison to earlier simulations that 
did not account for occupational outcome differences by college affiliation, some 




TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
6 There are other studies that use a similar method of estimating occupational outcomes by college 
affiliation, but they are not reported here because they do not report rates of return.  For example, Abe 
(1997) uses the Recruit data to estimate the probability that graduates from colleges that differ in rank 
enters prestigious (or popular) private sector firms.  Higuchi (1994) also uses the Recruit data to examine 
the distribution of college graduates’ employment into firms differing in size as a function of college rank. 
7 Earlier studies of this form were quite limited and primitive.  For example, Nobukuni (1977, cited in 
Iwamura 1996) estimates that national university graduates have the highest rate of return and private 
university graduates majoring in the sciences have the lowest rate of return.  This outcome is nothing 
more than a reflection of different tuition rates charged at these institutions.  It should also be noted that   7
 
First, differences in earnings result only from differences in the distribution of 
employment which may have little do with college quality.
8  Rates of return are 
estimated using the conditional probability of employment in a particular sector of the 
labor market given college affiliation.  For example, in Yano’s study, Waseda and Keio 
graduates have higher rates of return because these graduates were more likely to be 
employed in larger firms than graduates of other private universities.  Therefore, if by 
chance two universities of differing quality have the same employment distribution with 
respect to firm size, their rates of return will be identical.  Second, because the 
estimations are based on aggregate data, these studies assume that all individuals in the 
selected reference categories earn the same amount, e.g. all individuals working for 
firms with over 1000 employees earn the same regardless of the quality of college that 
they attended.  This is another way of saying that controlling for firm size has the same 
effect as controlling for college quality.  Third, since the data do not distinguish 
between men and women, they assume that gender differences in occupational 
outcomes are not significant.  But there remains a sizeable gender gap with respect to 
earnings and employment distribution in Japan, and such an assumption undermines the 
generalization of their results.  And fourth, because these estimates were derived 
through simulations involving different sources of data, we have no way of knowing if 
the rates of return between colleges are significantly different from each other.  The 
SSM microdata that I use in the current paper allow us to overcome these shortcomings.  
                                                                                                                                               
Iwamura’s estimates are internal rates of return and Yano’s estimates are private rates of return, so the 
two are not directly comparable.   8
The techniques and methods that I apply will be discussed in detail in Sections 3 and 4.   
 
 Features of the Japanese labor market 
  Rate of return estimations require specifying an earnings function that captures 
the essential features of the labor market.  We must therefore identify the key 
determinants of earnings so that they can be properly specified in the empirical analysis.  
Of considerable importance is accounting for the so-called unique features of the 
Japanese employment system.  In particular, comparative studies of Japanese and U.S. 
labor markets have established that employer (or demand-side) characteristics play a 
larger role in determining wages in Japan relative to the U.S. (Kalleberg and Lincoln 
1988; Kawashima and Tachibanaki 1986; Rebick 1993).
9  Neglecting to account for 
employer characteristics may therefore obscure true earnings.  In this section, I briefly 
discuss four distinctive features of the Japanese labor market which may influence 
earnings:  seniority based wages, permanent employment practices, “white-collarization 
of blue-collar workers,” and demarcation of the labor market by firm size. 
  (a) Seniority-based wages.  A seniority-based wage structure (hereafter 
seniority) is a system whereby wages rise with tenure (duration of employment with the 
same employer) and not necessarily with respect to work experience.  Although the 
seniority system is not necessarily unique to Japan, comparative studies have confirmed 
that the seniority effect is stronger among Japanese employers (Kawashima and 
Tachibanaki 1986; Mincer and Higuchi 1989).  For example, Hashimoto and Raisian 
                                                                                                                                               
8 Yano controls for firm-size differences but does not control for industry sector. 
9 For example, Rebick reports that human capital measures (education and experience) can explain up to   9
(1985) find that the tenure-earnings profile of Japanese workers is steeper than that of 
American workers.  Kalleberg and Lincoln (1988) find that wages of Japanese workers 
are determined primarily by age and seniority, while in the U.S. they are more likely to 
be conditioned by the occupation.
10  As Aoki (1988) explains, the persistence of 
seniority and permanent employment practices are “stylized facts” of the Japanese 
employment system. 
  (b) Permanent employment practices.  Evidence suggests that interfirm 
mobility is lower in Japan than in the U.S. (Hashimoto and Raisian 1989; Mincer and 
Higuchi 1987; Tachibanaki 1984).  Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) report that in the 
aggregate, Japanese male workers have longer tenure and hold fewer jobs throughout 
their careers than their U.S. counterparts.  They also find that years of work experience 
previous to the current firm tend to penalize earnings growth among Japanese workers, 
while the reverse holds true for U.S. workers.  Kato and Rockel (1992) find a similar 
pattern of rewards at the executive level.  In Japanese corporations, compensation is 
structured “so as to have managers penalized for job changes, whereas U.S. 
corporations tend to reward managers for engaging in job hopping” (p.47).  They 
suggest that such incentive structures encourage workers to be committed to the firm.  
Their findings reinforce the prevailing view that Japanese corporations are apt to engage 
in longer-term strategies owing to the lower turnover among executives. 
  (c) “White-collarization of blue-collar workers.”  The Japanese labor market is 
characterized by the comparatively weak distinction between blue- and white-collar 
                                                                                                                                               
one-third of the wage differentials in the U.S. versus only 10% for Japan. 
10 Lincoln and McBride (1987) assert that Japanese organizations avoid using detailed job descriptions,   10
workers.  Koike asserts that blue-collar workers in large Japanese establishments often 
acquire a wide range of skills through frequent job rotation.  Unlike their Western 
counterparts, Japanese blue-collar workers acquire high levels of firm-specific skills 
through their job experience, much as white-collar workers do.  Koike (1988) explains 
that this “white-collarization of blue-collar workers” obscures the distinction between 
the two occupational groups.  Using aggregate-level data, he shows that the shape of the 
experience-earnings profiles between blue- and white-collar workers in Japan are 
remarkably similar, while in Western countries we observe blue-collar earnings profiles 
that are typically much flatter relative to white-collar workers. 
  (d) Firm-size differences.  Comparative studies have found that labor market 
demarcation in Japan is more pronounced along lines of firm size rather than along 
different product markets and industries (Bronfenbrenner and Yasuba 1987; Kalleberg 
and Lincoln 1988; Kawashima and Tachibanaki 1986; Rebick 1993; Tachibanaki and 
Ohta 1994).  In contrast to large firms, small firms on average pay lower wages for 
similar types of work and provide fewer fringe benefits.
11  Yano (1991) explains that in 
Japan, firm size has an effect on earnings similar to that of educational attainment.
12  
Using estimates of lifetime income, he shows that middle school graduates working in 
large firms can overtake the earnings of university graduates working in small firms.  
                                                                                                                                               
and promote job rotation for both blue and white-collar workers.  They explain that, “Americans pursue 
careers within occupations that cut across firms, while the opposite pattern holds in Japan.” (p.297). 
11 For example, Bronfenbrenner and Yasuba (1987) find that in 1960, the ratio of mean wages in 
establishments with 5-29 workers versus establishments with more than 500 workers was .46.  In 1980, 
this ratio was .58.  Similarly, Rebick reports that in 1988, the difference in logged average hourly 
earnings between large (more than 1000) and small firms (less than 100) in Japan was .54 compared to 
.28 in the U.S.  See also, Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985) and Lincoln and McBride (1987) for explanations 
of firm-size differences in Japan. 
12 See also “Table 10.4:  Annual income (in yen) of university and high school graduates, by size of   11
Lower educated workers can therefore overcome their earnings deficits by being 
employed in larger size establishments. 
 
3  Data and Variables 
  The dataset used for the analysis is the 1995 Social Stratification and Mobility 
National Survey (SSM) which consists of a representative sample of men and women 
between the ages of 20 and 69 residing in Japan in 1995.
13  SSM is particularly suited 
for the present research because it reports the name of the college among respondents 
who attended college.  College quality is measured by the mean scores on entrance 
examinations administered by each college as reported by Obunsha (see Appendix for 
description of coding procedure).
14  By using a clear-cut hierarchical ranking of all 
schools included in the SSM survey, I avoid pigeonholing schools into a small number 
of categories.  Further, the SSM sample allows us to overcome the unrepresentative 
nature of previous studies which were limited to only a select group of colleges. 
  The SSM also includes a self-reported measure of the respondent’s grade point 
average (GPA) in ninth grade.
15  This feature allows controlling for individual ability 
differences in addition to college quality.  As Griliches and Mason (1972) have argued, 
it is misleading to assume that college quality and individual ability are substitutable 
because the two may be complementary:  ability may affect earnings independent of 
college quality.  Earnings functions which do not account for one or the other may 
                                                                                                                                               
company, Japan, 1982” in Ushiogi (1986: 202). 
13 I am grateful to Mary Brinton and the SSM Committee for permission to use the 1995 SSM data. 
14 I am grateful to Hisashi Arai of Obunsha for allowing me access to past issues of their publications. 
15 A caveat here is that self-reported GPA may be subject to measurement error.  See for example Kruger   12
therefore bias rate of return estimates.  By specifying the earnings function using 
individual ability and college quality, we can overcome the shortcomings of previous 
studies and derive more accurate rates of return. 
  The reliability of the SSM earnings data as a representative sample of Japanese 
male workers has been documented by Yano (1998), who compared the SSM data with 
actual earnings reported in the Ministry of Labor’s publication, Basic Wage Survey.
16  
Based on Mincerian estimation results, Yano shows that the SSM earnings data provide 
estimates that conform very closely to those of the Basic Wage Survey and suggests that 
the SSM earnings data are indeed “useful.”  My estimation results should therefore not 
be a misrepresentation of male workers in the Japanese labor force. 
  My empirical analysis is limited in the following ways.  First, my analysis is 
restricted to men.  Given the intermittent career mobility patterns of Japanese women, it 
is difficult to obtain reliable rate of return estimations for women.  An accurate analysis 
of women’s returns to college education would require that they be analyzed separately.  
Second, in order to minimize heterogeneity, I eliminate workers employed in 
agriculture and the government sector, because the employment practices in these 
sectors deviate from those in the private sector.
17  Third, the current sample of college 
graduates includes four-year university graduates only.  Respondents who were enrolled 
in college at the time of the survey were excluded.  Respondents who reported having 
graduated with Masters or Doctorate degrees were not considered because the SSM asks 
for the name of the university from which the respondent last graduated, so these 
                                                                                                                                               
and Dunning (1999) and Maxwell and Lopus (1994). 
16 I am grateful to Masakazu Yano for providing me with an early draft of his paper.   13
respondents provided the name of their graduate institutions and not their undergraduate 
institutions.  Since entrance examinations concern the admittance into universities from 
high school, the missing information was crucial, and I therefore excluded respondents 
who reported to have graduated with post-baccalaureate degrees.  And finally, the 
current sample excludes respondents who graduated from college under the prewar 
educational system.  Japan’s educational system – its curriculum and time spent in 
formal education – was revamped considerably by the U.S. Occupation.  The 
differential investments in human capital prior to the war may introduce heterogeneity 
into the empirical analysis.  Respondents who graduated college prior to 1953, the year 
that marks the first cohort under the postwar system, were dropped from the sample.  
The resulting sample size after accounting for the above conditions is 570.  The sample 
size remains the same throughout the analysis.  Table 2 provides the means, standard 
deviations, and brief descriptions of the variables used for the estimations.  Further 
descriptions of the variables will be provided in the following section where necessary. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
4  The rate of return to college education 
  This section describes the analysis and results of the rate of return estimations 
among Japanese male workers in the SSM survey.  Rates of return were estimated using 
                                                                                                                                               
17 For further discussion of government sector employment practices, see Yamaguchi (1983) and Ono 
(forthcoming).   14
the Mincerian regression.  The standard Mincerian equation takes the following form:
18 
 
  ε β β ρ α + + + + + = Xf
2
2 1 ln x x s Y  (1) 
 
where ln Y is the natural logarithm of annual earnings, s is the years of college 
completed, x is years of work experience, X is a vector of other variables which may 
affect earnings, ε is the error term, and α, ρ, and β are coefficients to be estimated from 
the regression.  In my analysis, s is coded as the number of years spent in college such 
that s = 0 for high school graduates, s = 4 for college graduates, and ρ measures the rate 
of return from an additional year of college education.  Work experience (x) is coded as 
the years of actual work experience that accounts for durations of non-employment. 
  Table 3 reports the results of F-tests conducted to compare models before and 
after addition of the variables described in Table 2.  The effects of individual ability and 
college quality were assessed separately (Models 20 to 23) in order to estimate the 
‘true’ effects of these variables before controlling for labor market characteristics.  I 
present the highlights from the model comparisons in greater detail in the following 
pages. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
College education, experience and tenure effects 
                                                 
18 See Mincer (1974) for assumptions underlying the equation.  For studies that evaluate the predictions   15
  The first three columns of Table 4 show the results of the Mincerian 
regressions examining the effects of college education, experience, and tenure.  The 
model numbers in Table 4 correspond to the model numbers reported in Table 3.  In 
Model 1, we confirm the strong predictive power of the standard Mincerian variables:  
Years of college, experience, and experience squared alone explain roughly one-third of 
the variance in earnings.  According to the basic equation (Model 1), the unadjusted (or 
gross) rate of return from one year of college education is 8.7 percent.  The starting 
salary of high school graduates is estimated to be 2,032,953 yen (= e
α = 14.525), which 
compares well with the 1,961,700 yen reported in the Basic Wage Survey in 1995. 
 
TABEL 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
  In Model 2, we find that the tenure effect is highly significant and positive, but 
that adding tenure-squared to Model 2 does not significantly improve the fit of the 
model (see Table 3).  Contrary to the concavity effects of work experience, the tenure 
effect is linear, suggesting that earnings continue to rise monotonically for workers who 
remain with the same firm.  In Model 4, we find that college education affects earnings 
primarily through its interactions with experience and tenure.  The signs of the 
coefficients suggest that compared to high school graduates, the experience earnings 
profile for college graduates is steeper and their returns to tenure are smaller. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
of the Mincer model, both theoretically and empirically, see for example, Björklund and Kjellström 
(2002), Blinder (1976), and Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2001).   16
 
Labor market effects 
  The last six columns of Table 4 show the results of Mincerian regressions after 
controlling for labor market characteristics.  In Model 7, we find that the coefficient for 
the number of previous employers is negative, thereby confirming that Japanese 
workers who change employers frequently are penalized for their actions.  We also 
confirm the effect of “white-collarization of blue-collar workers” in the Japanese labor 
market.  While white-collar workers earn more than blue-collar workers, we find that 
adding the variables interacting white-collar and experience, and white-collar and 
tenure to Model 7 does not improve the fit of the model (see Table 3, Models 9 and 10), 
i.e., the slopes of the earnings profile with respect to experience and tenure do not 
significantly differ between blue- and white-collar workers.  However, in Model 11, we 
find that the main effect of the number of previous employers becomes insignificant 
after we include its interaction term with the white-collar dummy.  This finding 
suggests that the penalty for job changes only applies to white-collar and not blue-collar 
workers. 
  We next add the industry dummies, consisting of manufacturing (omitted 
category), retail, finance and real estate, and services.  The results show that the 
variance in earnings across industries is significant (see Model 12 in Tables 3 and 4).  
Finally, the firm-size variable was added as the log of the firm-size.  The results show a 
significant improvement in fit (Model 16).  The significance of the interaction term 
between firm-size and tenure in Model 19 indicates that workers in larger firms have   17
more to gain from remaining in the same firm.
19 
Effects of individual ability and college characteristics 
  If earnings are a function of ability and not schooling, then estimations which 
do not control for ability may overestimate the true rate of return (Griliches and Mason 
1972; Hause 1971, 1972).  Equation (1) can be modified to account for individual 
ability (G) where: 
 
  ε τ ρ α + + + + = Xf G s Y ln  (2) 
 
In earnings comparisons between groups of high school and college graduates, 
individual ability must be a pre-college measure (or causally prior to college entry) that 
is available for both educational categories.  In my analysis, I use ninth grade GPA as a 
proxy for individual ability, appropriately selected because ninth grade is the last year 
of middle school in Japan.
20  If college education and ability are mere substitutes, years 
of college education would significantly improve earnings when ability is not included, 
but its effect would be cancelled out after controlling for ability.  On the other hand, if 
college education and ability are complementary, then the effects of college education 
will remain even after controlling for ability, suggesting that college education 
improves earnings, independent of individual ability.  Note that under both scenarios, 
                                                 
19 The addition of firm-size interaction with experience to Model 16 also improved predictions, but the 
tenure * firm-size interaction term was selected here because the improvement in R
2 was found to be 
greater (see Table 3, Models 18 and 19). 
20 In a purely theoretical human capital framework, “ability” is a measure of inherent (or endowed) ability 
such as IQ.  However, since IQ estimates are typically not available in surveys, researchers use some 
other measure to proxy ability.  Among others, see for example Griliches and Mason (1972) who use the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test from the 1964 CPS sample of World War II veterans and similarly 
Willis and Rosen (1979) and Wales (1973) who use military test scores from the NBER-Thorndike-
Hagen survey of 1968-1971.   18
controlling for ability will always have the effect of depressing the rate of return unless 
ability and college education are negatively correlated.   
  Individual ability may affect the earnings of high school and college graduates 
in different ways.  This can be examined by including an interaction term between 
college education and ability such that: 
 
  ε ϕ τ ρ α + + + + + = Xf sG G s Y ln  (2’) 
 
ϕ is the effect of ability on earnings in addition to the main effect of college education 
(ρ).  For example, ϕ > 0 means that the premium for higher ability will be larger among 
college graduates than for high school graduates. 
  Following Griliches and Mason (1972), equation (2’) can be further modified 
by accounting for college quality differences Q such that:
21 
 
  ε ϕ τ ξ ρ α + + + + + + = Xf sG G Q s Y ln  (3) 
 
It should be noted here that college quality is observed only among those respondents 
who attended college, so ρ cannot be estimated from the above equation.  Further, 
because college quality is entered into the equation linearly, it is a “shift” factor 
(Behrman and Birdsall 1983; Solmon and Wachtel 1975) which merely shifts earnings 
independently of schooling.  An adjustment can be made by entering college quality as 
                                                 
21 According to Griliches and Mason, the true effect of schooling (which they call E) must be captured 
with respect to both quantity and quality of education, and such an effect can be approximated by 
assuming that E = s + Q (or Q = E – s).  “Quality,” therefore, is the discrepancy between s and the true 
effect of schooling.   19
an interaction term with college education in the form: 
 
  ε ϕ τ ω ρ α + + + + + + = Xf sG G sQ s Y ln  (4) 
 
Since ∂lnY/∂s = ρ + ωQ + τG, the rate of return from college education can be obtained 
with respect to both quantity (ρ) and quality (ω).  Controlling for ability and college 
quality in the same equation allows us to examine the extent to which college quality 
proxies ability.  In an earlier study using the same dataset (Ono 2001), I find that higher 
ability individuals are more likely to advance to higher quality colleges.  This leads us 
with the possibility that ability and college quality may be substitutable, i.e. controlling 
for one variable will cancel out the effect of the other.  Past studies have found that 
ability and quality are positively correlated, but that the effect of quality remains 
significant even after controlling for ability (Kingston and Smart 1990; Solmon and 
Wachtel 1975; Wales 1973). 
  The first three columns of Table 5 shows the results of Mincerian regression 
which examine the ‘true’ effects of individual ability and college quality prior to 
examining labor market characteristics.  The model numbers in Table 5 correspond to 
the model numbers reported in Table 3.   
  We start with Model 20 which includes ninth-grade GPA while controlling for 
variables included in Model 2:  experience and tenure.  We find that the coefficients for 
both years of college education and ninth-grade GPA remain significant, and the rate of 
return is depressed from .084 to .069.  The results indicate that college education and 
individual ability are complementary:  High-ability individuals earn more, but attending 
college increases their earnings independent of individual ability.  In Model 21, we   20
conduct the same test that controls for the interaction effects of college education with 
experience and tenure (Model 4 variables).  We find that the coefficient for ninth-grade 
GPA is significant, but that the coefficient for years of college education is not.  This is 
not surprising because we have already established (from Models 4 to 19 in Table 4) 
that the effect of college education on earnings is manifested mainly through its 
interactions with experience and tenure.  But the positive coefficient for ninth-grade 
GPA confirms again that college graduates earn more if they have higher ability.  On 
the other hand, the interaction term with college education and ability is found to be 
statistically insignificant (see Model 22 in Table 4), suggesting that the effect of ability 
on earnings is not statistically different between high school and college graduates. 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
  In Model 23, the interaction term with years of college education and college 
quality is significant and positive.  This finding confirms the significance of college 
quality on earnings.  The coefficient for ninth-grade GPA is also significant, leading us 
to reject the possibility that ability and college quality are substitutable.  Even among 
individuals with the same ability, earnings are higher if they attended a higher quality 
college.  The results confirm the importance of treating ability and college quality 
separately in empirical analysis.  And finally, Model 24 shows the results of the 
Mincerian regression that controls for labor market characteristics examined in Model 
19 of Table 4.  The college quality effect remains significant and positive.  The effect of 
ninth-grade GPA is weakened suggesting that the impact of ability on earnings is   21
manifested indirectly vis-à-vis allocating workers into different positions in the labor 
market. 
  The ‘true’ rate of return to college education (ROR) was estimated as a 
function of college quality (Q).  For this purpose, we estimate a regression that only 
controls for individual-level attributes – in this case, experience, years of college 
education, and their interactions – but not employer characteristics.  As Becker (1993) 
explains, “the true effect of education on earnings operates primarily indirectly through 
the effect on knowledge and skills,” such that controlling for such measures as 
occupation and other labor market characteristics “can eliminate the true effect of 
education on earnings” (p.178, footnote 25).  Labor market characteristics are channels 
through which the effects of education are mediated.  Controlling for these 
characteristics will therefore undercut the true rate of return to education. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
  Figure 1a shows earnings profiles evaluated at the mean, minimum and 
maximum values of college quality, and Figure 1b shows the rate of return as a function 
of college quality.  The slope of the graph in Figure 1b is the marginal effect of college 
quality.  The rate of return ranges from a low of 2.5 percent to a high of 15.6 percent, 
with a mean of 7.9 percent.  The results indicate that an increase in college quality from 
one standard deviation (about 6.6 points) below the mean to one standard deviation 
above the mean raises the rate of return to college education from 5.2 to 10.6 percent.  
The results confirm the significant impact of college quality among Japanese college 
graduates.     22
 
5  Summary and discussion 
  This paper has examined the returns to college education among Japanese men.  
The rate of return to one year of college education that does not account for quality 
differences (i.e. the quantity effect) is found to be 8.7 percent.  I further find that college 
education affects earnings primarily through its interactions with experience and tenure, 
as college graduates accrue the returns from their education throughout their worklife. 
  Does college quality affect earnings?  The answer is undeniably yes.  My 
estimation results suggest that there is a substantial variation in the rate of return 
depending on the quality of the college attended, ranging from a low of 2.5 percent to a 
high of 15.6 percent.  Consistent with earlier research, the rate of return from college 
education is depressed after controlling for individual ability (as proxied by ninth grade 
GPA), but college quality effects remain significant, suggesting that college quality 
boosts earnings capacity independent of individual ability.   
  My results also confirm the distinctive features of the Japanese labor market, 
mainly the significant effects of tenure and firm-size on earnings, and the similarity in 
the compensation structures between white- and blue-collar workers.  I also find that 
workers are penalized for job-hopping, but that this penalty applies only for white-collar 
and not blue-collar workers. 
  In general, my estimations suggest that college quality effects in Japan are 
much stronger than previously claimed.  As explained in Section 2, studies of college 
quality in Japan have been limited, mainly because of data restrictions.  The drawback 
of these earlier estimations is that the differences in the rates of return only accounted   23
for differences in employment distribution.  In particular, it was assumed that all 
individuals within the same firm size category and/or industry sector earn the same 
regardless of college quality.  My estimation results suggest otherwise.  College quality 
effects persist strongly after controlling for various labor market characteristics, 
including firm size and industry, suggesting that even within the same employment 
categories, graduates of high-quality colleges earn significantly more. 
  The sizeable variation in the rate of return as a function of college quality 
confirms in part that examination hell and the obsessive pursuit of college quality in 
Japan is a rational pursuit.  Individuals are sufficiently motivated to get into the better 
colleges because the payoffs from college quality are substantial.  Put another way, we 
may infer that the variance in rewards is great enough to motivate college-bound 
students to pursue college quality. 
  International comparisons have consistently shown that the rate of return to 
college education in Japan is among the lowest in OECD countries (Blöndal, Field and 
Girouard 2002; Psacharopoulos 1985, 1993).  However, such comparisons may mask 
the true nature of investment motives for college education in Japan.  The average rate 
of return is an important determinant of college advancement, but it is the variance in 
rewards resulting from college quality that can truly explain the motivations underlying 
examination hell and the pursuit of college prestige in Japan. 
 Establishing  whether  examination hell is a good investment or not requires a 
cost-benefit analysis which examines benefits net of costs.  An example of this 
approach is illustrated by Ono (1999), and is worthy of further investigation.  This area 
of research can also benefit by examining other rewards that may motivate examination   24
hell.  For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that graduates from prestigious 
universities gain access to privileged social networks that improve their social mobility.  
A social capital approach to study the impact of college quality on social mobility 
would further our understanding of the incentives underlying examination hell and the 
quest for college quality. 
  A key aspect of higher education which I did not discuss in the current paper 
concerns family background effects on earnings.  In studies of stratification and 
inequality, the positive association between family background and education has been 
well established.  In a previous study (Ono 2001), I confirm that family background 
plays a decisive role in determining whether individuals advance to college or not in 
Japan.  This leaves us with the possibility that family background may affect earnings 
vis-à-vis individuals’ differential access to higher education.  As discussed by Altonji 
and Dunn (1996), studies that examine whether the returns to education vary 
systematically with family background remain surprisingly few.   Examining this 
missing link in the study of earnings in Japan warrants a separate detailed investigation. 
  And finally, the study of earnings inequality in Japan can benefit considerably 
from datasets that include a larger number of respondents.  Unlike the U.S., data access 
in Japan is still tightly regulated, making it difficult to conduct empirical research.  The 
analysis undertaken in the current paper, for example, can benefit by allowing us to split 
the sample into different cohorts to examine changes in the rates of return over time, 
and/or introduce more variables and interaction terms into our estimations.
22  
                                                 
22 See for example, Björklund and Kjellström (2002) who examine changes in the rate of return to college 




Coding college quality 
  Obunsha, a publishing company located in Tokyo, tabulates and publishes results of entrance 
examinations of Japanese colleges on an annual basis.  Their annual publication, Keisetsu Jidai, is the 
Japanese equivalent of the Barron’s Guide to American Colleges and ranks university departments based 
on results from the examinations administered in the previous year.  Test scores are standardized across 
different universities and range from 30 to 80 (80 being the highest). 
  The SSM dataset is a cross-sectional survey where the respondents’ ages range from twenty to 
seventy.  In terms of the entry year into college, these years range from 1945 to 1992.  In the coding 
process, I used the test scores from the 1966, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1986, 1992 issues of Keisetsu Jidai 
because there were small fluctuations in the scores of the individual schools over time (see Ishida, 
Spilerman and Su [1997] for a similar coding procedure using Obunsha data).  I used scores from these 
respective issues depending upon individuals’ entry year.  For example, if an individual entered college 
in 1973, I used the 1972 scores.  Because 1966 was the first year in which Obunsha began tabulating 
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Table 1  Rate of return estimates reported in previous studies
1 (%) 
 Universities  % 
Private rates of return (Yano 1978) 
 National universities – total  9.0 
    Imperial universities
2 9.5 
    Other old prestigious universities  9.1 
    New universities  8.7 
 Private universities – total  7.5 
    Waseda and Keio  8.4 
    Old private universities  7.7 
    New private universities  6.9 
  
Internal rates of return (Iwamura 1996) 
3  
 Top national universities   
    Hitotsubashi  10.5 
    Yokohama  9.8 
    Chiba  9.4 
 Top private universities   
    Keio  9.9 
    Rikkyo  9.0 
    Aoyama  9.1 
    Gakushuin  9.2 
    Seijou  8.3 
 Other private universities   
    Komazawa  8.1 
    Musashi  8.3 
1 Estimates reported here are for social science majors in Yano’s study and economics majors in 
Iwamura’s study. 
2 “Imperial universities” include Hokkaido, Tohoku, Tokyo, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka and Kyushu 
Universities, “other old prestigious universities” include Tokyo Institute of Technology, Hitotsubashi, 
Kobe, Tokyo Foreign Languages and Osaka Foreign Languages Universities, “new universities” 
include other national universities not included in the first two categories, “old private universities” 
include Meiji, Hosei, Rikkyo, Chuo, Doshisha, Ritsumeikan, Kansai Gakuin, Jochi (Sophia), Aoyama, 
Meiji Gakuin, ICU and Gakushuin, and “new private universities” include other private universities not 
included in the first two categories of private universities. 
3 Results of the Iwamura study reported here were selected from her full study which included a total of 
33 university departments. 
   31
 
 
Table 2  Means and standard deviations of variables used for estimations 
Variables   Mean    S.D.  
Logged annual earnings (yen)               15.46                  0.54  
Years of college education                 1.30                  1.87  
Experience               20.83                11.35  
Tenure (duration of employment at current firm)               14.43                10.95  
Number of previous employers                 2.12                  1.34  
White-collar occupation dummy                 0.59                  0.49  
Industry = Manufacturing                 0.49                  0.50  
Industry = Retail                 0.23                  0.42  
Industry = Finance and real estate                 0.06                  0.24  
Industry = Services                 0.21                  0.41  
Logged firm size                 4.26                  2.23  
Grade point average (GPA) in ninth grade                 3.26                  1.09  
College quality (college graduates only)               51.34                  6.68  




Table 3  Model comparisons for Mincerian regression estimations 
 
Model Variables   df  R
2        F prob    
College education, experience and tenure effects          
1  Years of college, experience, experience squared      3  0.339  -     
2  Model 1 + tenure      4  0.361  vs      1   0.000  ** 
3  Model 2 + tenure squared      5  0.361  vs      2   0.578   
4  Model 2 + years of college * experience, years of college * 
experience squared, years of college * tenure      6  0.376  vs      2   0.004  ** 
           
Labor market effects          
5  Model 4 + number of previous employers      8  0.390  vs      4   0.000  ** 
6  Model 5 + years of college * number of previous employers     9  0.393  vs      5   0.081   
7  Model 5 + white-collar      9  0.406  vs      5   0.000  ** 
8  Model 7 + years of college * white-collar    10  0.408  vs      7   0.188   
9  Model 7 + white-collar * experience    10  0.406  vs      7   0.999   
10  Model 7 + white-collar * tenure    10  0.406  vs      7   0.974   
11  Model 7 + number of previous employers * white-collar    10  0.418  vs      7   0.001  ** 
12  Model 11 + industry    13  0.435  vs    11   0.001  ** 
13  Model 12 + years of college * industry    16  0.436  vs    12   0.743   
14  Model 12 + experience * industry    16  0.442  vs    12   0.075   
15  Model 12 + tenure * industry    16  0.441  vs    12   0.085   
16  Model 12 + log firm-size    14  0.442  vs    12   0.009  ** 
17  Model 16 + years of college * log firm-size    15  0.442  vs    16   0.561   
18  Model 16 + experience * log firm-size    15  0.447  vs    16   0.018  * 
19  Model 16 + tenure * log firm-size    15  0.459  vs    16   0.000  ** 
           
Individual ability (GPA) and college quality        
20  Model 2 + ninth grade GPA      5  0.373  vs      2  0.001  ** 
21  Model 4 + ninth grade GPA      8  0.388  vs      4   0.001  ** 
22  Model 21 + years of college * ninth grade GPA      9  0.388  vs    21   0.868   
23  Model 21 + years of college * college quality      9  0.404  vs    21   0.000  ** 
           
Labor market effects + individual ability (GPA) and college quality      
24  Model 19 + ninth grade GPA, years of college 
* college quality    17  0.474  vs    19   0.000  ** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01  33 
Table 4  Mincerian regression results
1 
   1     2     4     7     11     12     16     19    
Years of college   0.087**  0.084**  0.017  -0.014  -0.030  -0.038  -0.038  -0.023 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029) 
Experience 0.071**  0.061**  0.046**  0.052**  0.050**  0.049**  0.050**  0.048** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 


































Years of college * experience          0.012**  0.013**  0.015**  0.015**  0.014**  0.013** 
         (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 




























Number of previous employers              -0.053**  -0.017  -0.014  -0.012  -0.015 
             (0.017)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
White-collar dummy              0.158**  0.357**  0.352**  0.304**  0.284** 
             (0.040)  (0.072)  (0.072)  (0.074)  (0.073) 
Number of previous employers                   -0.092**  -0.081**  -0.068*  -0.067* 
  * white-collar dummy                  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028) 
Industry = Retail                      -0.111*  -0.077  -0.066 
                     (0.047)  (0.049)  (0.048) 
Industry = Finance and real estate                     0.147  0.141  0.146 
                     (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.076) 
Industry = Services                      0.069  0.084  0.083 
                     (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.047) 
Log firm-size                          0.023**  -0.022 
                         (0.009)  (0.014) 
Tenure * log firm-size                              2.89×10
-3** 
                             (6.96×10
-4) 
Constant 14.525**  14.548**  14.652**  14.696**  14.629**  14.638**  14.534**  14.737** 
 (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.077)  (0.081)  (0.083)  (0.085)  (0.093)  (0.104) 
R
2 0.339     0.361     0.376     0.406     0.418     0.435     0.442     0.459    
* p<.05, ** p<.01.  Standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
1 Model numbers correspond to Model numbers in Table 3.   34
 
 
Table 5  Mincerian regression results
1 
 
 20    21    23    24    Estimation 
equation 
 
                    
Years of college   0.069**  0.006  -0.213**  -0.214**  -0.205** 
  (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.063)  (0.060)  (0.064) 
Ninth grade GPA  0.060**  0.060**  0.046*  0.021  0.048** 
  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
                     
Years of college *           4.13E-03**  3.57E-03**  4.11E-03** 
  College quality          (1.06E-03)  (1.01E-03)  (1.08E-03) 
                     





interactions   
                     
R
2  0.373     0.388     0.404     0.474     0.376    
* p<.05, ** p<.01.  Standard errors reported in parenthesis. 








  (a) Earnings profiles  (b) Rate of return 
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Rate of Return 
(ROR)
[min] Q = 38.5
         ROR = 0.025
[mean] Q = 52.1
            ROR = 0.079
[max] Q = 70.4
          ROR = 0.156